Introduction
Many people have fallen in love with Babe since its inception in 1995. It is an adaption from the kid-lit novel ‘The Sheep-Pig’, written by Dick King-Smith in 1983, which embarked upon changing the standpoint and belief, so firmly held by society, that pigs are stupid creatures, void of any other purpose other than human consumption. It is for this reason that Babe represents such an iconic figure for many of the generation Y and X children that have been charmed by the ‘wee-pig’. Admittedly, many movies have embarked to thematize barnyard alis and construct a rapport with their audience though anthropomorphism (Charlotte’s Web, The Animals of Farthing Wood, et cetera). Why then does Babe have such appeal over other movies and shows of that era, age demographic and stylization? A classic lit-analysis would portend such prescient issues such as how the (Tolkienish) journey is embarked upon, how adversity and oppression are overcome, and how marginalisation is rampant within society. Its main focus being upon the text’s intrinsic forms and representation, rather than the underlying subtextual scope. I would like to put forward the notion that this text is a perfect account of ‘bestial lex populi’. Its appeal, rather than being based purely on its stylization and beautiful prose/dialogue, is in its subliminal referencing to cultural theory and jurisprudence. Although Babe does lack a legal surface detail (courts, lawyers’, legalese) its legal underpinning can be found through the exposure of societal legalistic issues: class, gender and, particularly, race which lies upon the contractual property regimes of animal slavery.
Sixteen years have passed since Babe was in cinemas, and over that time, many websites have tried to ‘piece’ together the philosophy of Babe. Most of the (fan)analysis has only credited an ultra vires or intra vires approach, which appears to limit the “legal imagination” and subvert the subjectivity of jurisprudential legal fictions. The philosophy in Babe is obviously theoretical and abstract, but the key areas that I believe to be the most imperative have been hitherto overlooked. What I intend to do is rectify the inadequacies of the current literature by viewing the shows’ juristically as a whole-system of interconnected characters with varying standpoints. There are many nuances and metaphors, throughout the movie, that are not clear at first. Nevertheless, it is these similitude’s to cultural movements (human rights, feminism, queer theory), that develop an a-legal quotidian of “cultural” and “legal” representation. It is for this reason that I suggest looking at Babe as a jurisprudential text. And, from this, recontextualise, for a generalist audience, the issues of law, and the issues of (in)justice, which are pertinently illustrated throughout.
Bacon or Babe
The movie starts with a voice-over stating that ‘bacon’, ‘ham’, and ‘pork chops’, all come from the same ‘wonderful, magical animal’. It shows the piglet suckling upon his mother, only to be interrupted by the prodding of an electrical rod, and the mother pigs being ‘man-handled’ into the awaiting (Sunny Valley) meat lorry. A few minutes later an artificial feeder drops down to the piglets, in an almost Erik Erikson styled regiment, which is also similar to Pavlov’s behaviourism, the pigs separate themselves from their mother, and continue suckling from the ‘artificial’ teat as they did before. The narrator then continues to tell the story (false consciousness) of the adaged fiction held by the pigs:
This is a tale about an unprejudiced heart, and how it changed our valley forever. There was a time not so long ago when pigs were afforded no respect, except by other pigs; they lived their whole lives in a cruel and sunless world. In those days pigs believed that the sooner they grew large and fat, the sooner they’d be taken into Pig Paradise, a place so wonderful that no pig had ever thought to come back.
It is this ‘cruel world’, or as Hobbes contended, a world at war with “no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of [wo]man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”, that I wish to embark upon. For it is this specieism that allows for the profiteering in slavery, and grants those with vested interests the permission to mistreat pigs and other animals; indeed, to allow them to endure, for the benefit of humans, a life without a sovereign (protection), a life of pain (caged), and a life of uncertainty (international live exports).
Brian Sherman’s article ‘From Paddock to Prison’ illustrates the starting sequence of Babe unerringly:
when buying bacon, ham and pork, most Australians imagine pigs living in the ‘old MacDonald farm’ of nursery rhymes, roaming freely and wallowing in the mud.
The reality, as he asserts, is that 90% of Australian pigs live a life more sinister. Their lives are unlike Babe’s whose fortunes at the Hogget’s farm are exemplary, but rather housed in stalls, with an inability to move, living an artificial life, surrounded by the watchmen of a Foucaultian/Benthamic Panoptico-discipline.
In relation to this, Babe can be read in two distinct ways that compliment, rather than detract, from the veracity of the argument. The first is looking at Babe in the context of an animal rights advocate, and I agree that the resounding reason for the movie was to regain controversy on the lack of regulations in 1995. The second, however, is that the characters are portending a legalistic scheme and putting forward a critique of the law, not so much of animal law (or lack of), but the ‘the rule of law’. The similitude’s that are drawn, such as the misconception that humans are different to pigs, can be seen at the fair with the squealing children and the analogous squeals of the runt as both are forcefully tossed upside down. Furthermore, it can be seen with the nauseating Mrs. Hogget’s approach to the pig. Looking up at her, she asks ‘who’s going to grow up to be a big fat pig?’ It is this caricature that I believe sets the scene for the remainder of the movie. On the one hand, we have the lean, well-mannered and kind pig, the other, its binary opposite. This naturally conjures the question: who is this pig, and who would want to grow up to be like it?
Mr. Hogget encounters this contextual issue with the fact Babe may be a pig, but he is different, strange, or as Critical Legal Theory (CLT) contends ‘altere’. He is the otherness, a sub-category of beings that do not function as the normal. And indeed, this is where Babe garners his charm. For although babe may be a gender neutral, runt(ish) piglet, whose vantage was not always so, he personifies a softer law of morality, and gives a proto-feministic contra juridico-political recount of the roles that certain animals fill within human lives: notably the credence that many people pay to a chattels characteristics of ‘cuteness, tastefulness and practicality’.
Moreover, this is how the system of consumerism has evolved, and allowed for elevated statuses amongst the three competing classes: companion (the evil, Machiavellian cat), farm (Rex and Fly – the practical, loyal sheep dogs) and entertainment animals (the miniature ponies at the fair). It is this differentiated regime of classes that contests, as much as confirms, the issues of Marxist class struggles within the movie and in the context of Australian regulation.
What occurs is analogous to what Goran Therborn put forward in 1978, whereby the regulation benefits the farmers, and an animal’s welfare is only thought of when profits may be damaged by adverse opinion. For what Babe feels, with the hierarchies (from the Hogget’s, to the ‘cat’, to the dogs, who enforce the law, et cetera) within the movies, are nevertheless just demonstrative of the classes – so I hazard – within society.
Cat: “Well, the cow’s here to be milked, the dogs are here to help the Boss’s husband with the sheep, and I’m here to be beautiful and affectionate to the boss.”
The notion of equality that Babe puts forward for unrequited love instantiates a symbolic gesture (akin to C. S. Lewis’s Aslan) for respect of all sentient beings, regardless of status, and even more so, industry.
Babe’s Jouissance: Sex, Class and Feminism
The radical feminist movement draws resemblance to how Marx categorized the economical systems of capitalism; being based upon sex, class and the disproportionate power dispersions in society. The Hogget’s farm is a clear contender for how class, sex and station radically differentiate the outcomes and possibilities availed. It becomes unmistakable that rather than displace these preconceived notions, the law enforcers (Rex and Fly), embrace their feudal control, seizing it and enforcing it in a Machiavellian demonstration of might, rather than right. At Babe’s first failed attempt at sheep-herding, he is vouchsafed by fly:
Fly: Nonsense, it’s only your first try. But you’re treating them like equals. They’re sheep, they’re inferior.
Babe: Oh, no they’re not.
Fly: Of course they are. We are their masters, Babe. Let them doubt it for a second and they’ll walk all over you.
Rex the Male Sheepdog: Fly! Get the pig out of there!
Fly: Make them feel inferior – abuse them, insult them.
Indeed, it is this approach that is remunerative of class conflict and sexual inequality. The only animals, apart from Fly, to be female, are the sheep. And their voice is estranged (higher pitched, slower elocution, et cetera), a concept that Carol Gilligan called the “other voice”. It is this ideology of the sheep dogs, pertaining to sheep being incapable of speaking, stupid, inane, et cetera, which allowed for the inequality and mistreatment. Once again, this is analogous to the argument put forward in relation to animal rights treatment, it is clear that the voice of an animal is masked by corporate agenda and cultural proclivities, and lost behind catchy slogans, and misrepresentation of smiling cows and free-range grassy pastures.
For those who are in the minority, the law in Babe is a ‘negative liberty’, an ‘antithesis’, as Isaiah Berlin would contend. It overlooks those whom the law should protect, and gives power/authority to those with the vested interests. Indeed, the only person who looks outside the ancien regime of feudalism is Mr. Hogget. Although softer, and more tolerable, the justice that he stands for in this world is Benthamic, rather than Rawlsian, and a receding figure of power on the social lawscape. Nevertheless, Mr. Hogget evinces, may, on the surface, appear to be constructing a social movement. It is indeed, his joussance and reassuring respect for the ‘wee-pig’, to overlook the obvious classicism pertained to animal, and give the altere an equal opportunity. In the resounding scene, where Mr. Hogget enlists Babe as the applicant, as ‘pig’, and outstrips the other ‘savages’ with their brute force in the sheep trials, the very prejudices that hold society on to can be seen:
Narrator: And though every single human in the stands or in the commentary boxes was at a complete loss for words, the man who in his life had uttered fewer words than any of them knew exactly what to say.
Farmer Hoggett: That’ll do, pig. That’ll do.
Indeed, it this Schmitt-like lawscape that exacerbates law’s violence rather than displaces it, and encourages, both politically and legally, the mentality of separation, namely, an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy.
Race is also personified through two most unlikely characters, Ferdinand the duck, and the lone ‘black sheep’. Indeed, on the one hand, there is Ferdinand, constantly ‘flighty’, who confides that, ‘I suppose [that] the life of an anorexic duck doesn’t amount to much in the broad scheme of things’, and the other, the lone, nameless sheep, whose disposition, as the CRT movement would contend, affirms racial lines: legitimizing minority marginalisation, and the limiting of opportunities based on colour. There is a ‘whiteness’ that underpins the ideological content of their ‘barnyard education’, with its’ inculcation on distinguishing (white) factors and hierarchy, and displaying a limited approach in addressing the needs of their personal community, which draws analogies to the world outside of this superlunary farm. Indeed, the reference to education can be taken a step further. As Noam Chomsky stated:
“Mass education was designed to turn independent farmers into docile, passive tools of production. That was its primary purpose.”
If the system was built to produce a “docile compulsive” labour force, rather than cultivating mental growth and maturity, there can be no surprise that the corollary evades a prescription of overlooking the justice of others, and using others as instruments for personal gratification.
Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, there rises an entire superstructure of different and distinctively formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms the starting point out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations.
It is this Hegelian/Marxist mini-dialectic that is alluded to within this Draconian system. Each ‘class’, both of animal and status, establish and internalise the nexus of law and morality.
Babe: Baa-ram-ewe! Baa-ram-ewe! To your breed, your fleece, your clan be true! Sheep be true! Baa-ram-ewe!
As each animal affirms, and confirms, their industry, so too do they internalize and overlook the very existential components of their lives. For what Babe does is hold a mirror up to the lives of humans, it symbolizes the class control, speciesism and injustices that are so often overlooked. What Babe does so magically is emblematize the conflict within society, both intrinsic (with the hierarchy at the farm) and extrinsically (Australian animal regulations) through defining the core issues with the current system: the separation of oneself with the products through the merveilleux advertising, and the redefining of products, starkly different to what characteristics the animal held prior.
Defining Rights
Ferdinand: The fear’s too much for a duck. It – it eats away at the soul! There must be kinder dispositions in far-off gentler lands.
Cow: The only way you’ll find happiness is to accept that the way things are is the way things are.
Ferdinand: ‘The way things are’ stinks! I’m not gonna be a goner, I’m gone! I wish all of you the best of luck.
Everyone, at Hogget farm, makes pretenses about how they feel about the current system. Nevertheless, they all eventually accept the hierarchy. It appears that this ‘apolitical’ world is actually absorbed into a debate about the politics of the law. It figuratively delves into what could be titled ‘class constructivism’, but this does not fully encapsulate the greater issue, as Herbert Marcuse contends, that the system ‘judges them, without being judged by them or being able to be called to account by them, for there is no authority or judge above them’. It is this quasi-reality, both contentious and (un)endearing that the text etherealises as the perfect ‘farm’. Indeed, for many people, the Hogget farm exemplifies their notion of how animals are treated. The obvious truth about industrial farming becomes un-attestable in today’s context; for where the Babe-kid-lit fantasy allows for a system of respect, even – I hazard – a level of rapport between the farmer and his stock, the system of mass(murder) factory farming dissociates at every level. It entwines Marx’s dull compulsion with Foucault’s power dispersions, and, as seen in the classic psychology experiment of the ‘Stanford Prison’, those in power can manipulate cruelty to unfathomable portions, and yet, those involved, feel no accountability.
A revivified rights discourse is actually brought up through the dialogue with Ferdinand and Babe. For many westernised humans, Christmas is time of ‘sharing’, a time to be thankful for everything we have, and many other adaged maxims. But, for Ferdinand, and those who live on this Hobbessian farm, Christmas is a much more sinister occurrence.
Ferdinand: Christmas! Christmas dinner, yeah. Dinner means death. Death means carnage! Christmas means carnage!
Indeed, it is this Posnerian counter-culture where ‘it is wrong to give as much weight to a dog’s pain as to an infant’s pain’, which, undeniably, allows for such inequalities to occur. The conception of justice should be weighed upon a scale that looks past social, religious and economical ideologies, and should focus on the core underlying facets, that are not just akin to ‘humanity’: namely, that animals do not differ in their propensity to suffer. The principles of justice should be chosen behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, with the notion that, behind this veil, in the actual world, not only does one not know their industry, class, race, sex, et cetera, they, furthermore, do not know what species they may be.
It is only through this conception of justice that equality can be reached to safeguard the lives of both animals and humans. It would, undoubtedly, improve the lives of animals and, for that matter, many humans to take an approach that limited class structure and disproportionate rights control of particular dominant groups. Moreover, what can be seen with the regulatory regimes of Australian animals, and so too, on Hogget farm, are the rights of the few being displaced by those in the reigning hierarchical positions of yesteryears. As Therborn contended, ‘the ruling class does what it requires to maximize control’, and indeed, it has done well with maximizing profits through the underhandedness of imbuing a false consciousness into consumers over the treatment of animals. It is this unfair, and antiquarius summation of rights, which is portended upon animals, that must be reviewed in the light of an equal society. It must overlook the proclivities and hitherto structure of regulation, and be based upon premises that revoke the pain and suffering; moreover, being based upon a morality of Rawlsian conception, where there is a distribution of justice for all those with the ‘capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain’.
Conclusion: The Story of Bacon or ‘Babe’
The issues that Babe confronts are multifaceted, but diverge upon two direct lines of cultural legal thought. The first (intrinsic) is the rapport that young audiences build with the ‘wee-pig’. This rapport caused much controversy in the years closely following the movie release, as many people were indecisive about the practices of animal regulation in Australia, and sought to buy ‘free-range’ in an effort to minimize their discomfort of eating a lovable animal. The second (extrinsic) is the legal ramification of status (ownership) of animals. The law has been silent in many areas as the how an animal is to be protected, and, indeed, how they too have rights. It is this Marxist critique that I believe converges on the point that the film is making. It is about rights, or lack of rights, and how the petit bourgeoisie instills false consciousness onto consumers.
Babe stands for a post-modern conceptualization of a rights-bearer – an advocate of justice, a pervasive face in the animal rights movement – being a paradigm of social classism, and inequality. The corollary that Babe evinces, however, is a universal maxim about power: ‘all power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. Indeed, what Babe stands for is legitimacy, for universalism, a step away from the immunity that is offered to those who abuse animals, and a recasting of rights, where justice is on trial and not hidden behind locked factory doors.
Through reading Babe from a lit-legal-analysis it is clear that it can be thematised by sociology, psychology, feminism, Marxism, CLT and CRT. For Babe’s failures are indicative of the failures of society. Indeed, the failure for humans to look at life from a differing standpoint; to the pain, discomfort and death that people mindlessly take part therein. If Babe stands for anything, I hope that it is for the promotion of a better world: a world where regulations safeguard rights, and rights are safeguarded by justice. A world where animals have a voice, and where the voice of a ‘piglet’ is worth just as much as the voice of a small child.
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