When people deliberate over the meaning of life’s existence, often they are seeking to attain knowledge of how the existence of one of us over time employs a purpose. Beyond drawing the distinction between the life of an individual and that of a group, there has been very little discussion of life as the bearer of meaning. Most philosophical writings on meaning pronounce degrees and stages of time, in that, some periods of life are more meaningful than others, and that some lives as a whole are more purposeful, Britton (1969). Although not particularly coherent, the view that some people’s lives are less meaningful, or even meaningless, exhibits a self-purpose and worth of virtue that only a few possess or can obtain. Kant relies upon the notion that people have an intrinsic worth in virtue of their capacity for autonomous choices, where meaning is a function of the exercise of this capacity, Nozick (1974). Although a lovely gesture, morality does not counsel as an agent to help people with relatively meaningless lives, at least if the condition is not of an individuals’ choosing it is not in their ability to act upon and change it.
To have ‘meaning’ connotes a qualified component indifferent to happiness or aptness. Just because an individual believes their life encompasses purposefulness, does not imply that their rationale to life is rife with meaning and joy. A life altered by hallucinogenic drugs may contain happiness and a purpose of leaving the real for the surreal, but this does not signify a meaningful existence. This escapism from the laborious, tedious and often banal realism of living is purely only of self-gratification and an escape of oneself from actuality. This figure negates any purposeful attribution to living. Although the individual may escape the meaninglessness of their existence, the time they spend envisaging their own utopia, is time spent contemplating the inept and pain of the world outside the fantasy. As a result, the euphoria for the individual is attainable only through this surreal environment; with its lack of cohesive truths, it simulates delusions of contentment facilitating life’s mere tolerability.
The pursuit of eudemonia, the path to ‘true happiness’ as a possibility to attaining possible ‘meaning’, hypothetically underpins having achieved a choice-worthy purpose, Nielsen (1964). Even so, eudemonia in theory could simply be a cover for an individual thinking that they are obtaining happiness through assertion, opposed to the actual attainment. In this sense, life could be weighed as a series of ‘right choices’ and disjointed events, ultimately disguising the meaningless etude of purpose. Consequently, the attainment of happiness, does not proposition to an actual meaning. Just because humans may deem a pigs purpose to being eaten, certainly would not mean that the pig would be happy with its purpose in life. Similarly, it would be a pointless endeavour to state the meaning of one’s life was to be ‘happy’, when happiness in its most simplified form, is merely a facade of paucity and unattainable ideals.
Conclusively, the achievement of a truly meaningless existence is to express the ideology of the lack of a deity and afterlife. For there could be nothing worse than living a truly miserable existence, without hope, love and security, only to precede death as life’s finality and the end of a meaningless struggle.